At approximately 0820, on August 29, 1988, the nuclear‑powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), while entering the harbor at Hampton Roads, Virginia, struck the anchored Spanish bulk carrier Urduliz. The Urduliz was anchored adjacent to the Entrance Reach Channel waiting for a berth at the coal loading piers at Lamberts Point, Norfolk, Virginia. The Eisenhower was returning to its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, after a 6‑month deployment in the Mediterranean Sea. No one was injured. The accident resulted in $2 million in estimated damage to the Eisenhower and $317,128 in damage to the Urduliz.

The safety issues discussed in the report are:

1. The pilot employment practices of the U.S. Navy for its vessels transiting Norfolk harbor.

2. The location of the anchored Urduliz in relation to the channel.

3. The U.S. Navy harbor control of naval vessel traffic.

4. The non-navigational factors associated with the arrival from an overseas deployment which influence navigational decisions.

5. The Entrance Reach Channel width and navigation aids.

Recommendations concerning these issues have been made to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the delayed and insufficient action to correct the Eisenhower's deviation from the intended track by the navigator and the officer of the deck because of inexperience in piloting the vessel through the restricted channel in Hampton Roads; the selection by the navigator of a course through the Entrance Reach Channel that did not compensate for the current and the wind; and the inadequate monitoring of the navigation of the vessel by the commanding officer. Contributing to the accident was the navigator's order to reduce the speed from 5 knots to 3 knots in an attempt to reach buoy "3" at a prescribed time and the inadequate guidance by the U.S. Navy on the use of pilots on large vessels.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT

RAMMING OF THE SPANISH BULK CARRIER URDULIZ

BY THE USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)

HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA

AUGUST 29, 1988

INVESTIGATION

Events preceding the Accident

On August 13, 1988, the 897‑foot‑long Spanish bulk carrier Urduliz (see figure 1) departed Gijon, Spain, for Norfolk, Virginia, to load a cargo of coal, as part of a long term charter to deliver coal to Gijon. At 1219, on August 25, 1988, the vessel arrived at Hampton Roads, southwest of Old Point Comfort, Virginia, and anchored in berth "Z," anchorage "A" (see figure 2), under the direction of a pilot from the Virginia Pilot Association. The pilot anchored the vessel near the center of the 1,500‑foot radius of the circular‑shaped berth as marked on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) navigation chart numbered 12245 (47th edition, dated June 30, 1984; this was the latest edition of the chart). He used the port anchor and six shots (540 feet) of anchor chain to hold the Urduliz in the anchorage and departed the vessel at 1330. The vessel remained anchored awaiting a berth at the coal loading piers at Lamberts Point, Norfolk, Virginia. (See figure 3.) Anchor bearings recorded in the Urduliz deck log on August 25, and marked on its navigation chart, located the vessel's navigation bridge within 300 feet of the center of berth "Z." The bow of the Urduliz was about 1,200 feet north of the northern edge of the Entrance Reach Channel as marked on NOAA chart 12245. This was also about 600 feet north of the new northern edge of the channel delineated by the Newport News Channel Lighted Buoy "2" and the Thimble Shoal Channel Lighted Buoy "22" which had been repositioned on March 24, 1988. (See the section entitled "Entrance Reach Channel and Channel Marking" for more details.) At 0650, on August 29, 1988, the vessel's agent notified the master of the Urduliz to be ready to move the vessel from the anchorage to the coal piers at 0900. According to the master, at 0700, in preparation for the move, all navigational equipment, steering, and emergency maneuvering systems were tested and found to be satisfactory.

On August 27, 1988, after a 6‑month deployment in the Mediterranean Sea, the 1,090‑foot‑long United States Navy (Navy) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) (Eisenhower) (See figure 4) boarded about 500 "Tigers"¹ at Bermuda while on the final let of its return voyage to its home port at Norfolk Virginia. During the afternoon of August 28, the junior officer of the deck/conning officer (JOOD) scheduled to conn² the Eisenhower into Norfolk conducted a navigation briefing for entering port with the commanding officer (CO), the officer of the deck (OOD), the navigator, and the navigation teams. The OOD stated that procedures for entering port, courses, speeds, changes to channels and buoy placement, and other matters affecting the vessel movement were reviewed. Navigation charts had been corrected by the chief quartermaster³ using the weekly Notice to Mariners No. 18/88 dated April 30, 1988, to show new buoy locations. The corrected charts were used to plan the vessel's arrival. That afternoon, all of the fixed‑wing aircraft assigned to the Eisenhower were flown off the vessel to return to their home units ashore. During the morning of August 29, 1988, the remaining helicopters were flown off to Norfolk area airfields while the vessel was inbound from Cape Henry, Virginia.

The Accident

At 0716, on August 29, 1988, the Eisenhower was inbound in the Thimble Shoal Channel and passed through the southern opening of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge‑Tunnel. (See figure 3.) The Eisenhower was proceeding at a speed of about 11 knots (55 RPM). On the bridge, there were at least 20 crewmembers for entering port: the CO, the navigator, the OOD, the JOOD, an officer liaison with the tactical operations plot (TOP) radar navigation team⁴ (he moved between the radar navigation compartment and the navigation bridge), several other officers, a chief quartermaster supervisor of visual navigation, a navigation plotter, a visual bearing recorder and sound-powered telephone talker, a deck log keeper, two helmsmen, a lee helmsman or engine order operator, two visual bearing takers, and several sound-powered telephone talkers connected to various stations throughout the vessel. In addition, there were 6 to 8 Tigers, news media representatives who interviewed the CO, and an undetermined number of other crewmembers on the bridge observing the activities. Sounds from orders and repeated orders, three radio channels, internal vessel telephones, flight operations, conversations, lookout reports, visual bearing reports, and other reports were heard on the bridge.

Many of the journalists and photographers who were embarked early on the morning of the accident for coverage of the port arrivals were on the flight deck at the time of the accident. While inbound, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and the Admiral in command of the Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT), arrived aboard the vessel via helicopter to formally welcome the crew of the Eisenhower on its return from its Mediterranean deployment. The COMNAVAIRLANT and the SECNAV departed the vessel via helicopter at 0732 and 0807, respectively.

At 0747, the Eisenhower exited Thimble Shoal Channel and continued on its course toward Old Point Comfort. At 0752, the OOD reduced speed to 10 knots (50 RPM). About 0753, the Eisenhower bridge watch sighted the Urduliz about 5 miles away. About 1 hour earlier, the bridge watch had been informed of a vessel anchored in berth "Z," anchorage "A," by the USS Thomas C. Hart (FF‑1092), a naval vessel preceding them into Norfolk. About 0800, as the Eisenhower was approaching the turn at Old Point Comfort, the bridge watch received a bridge‑to‑bridge radio telephone call for a port‑to‑port meeting from a naval warship. The warship was "well off the port bow," and identified as a nuclear‑powered attack submarine. Safety Board investigators determined the submarine to be the USS Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN 685) (LIPSCOMB). Port Services had scheduled it for departure from its berth at the Naval Station at 0730, and it departed between 0730 and 0800. Also about 0800, the navigator confirmed, via radiotelephone, to the Naval Station's Port Operations Department that the Eisenhower would be arriving at the Elizabeth River Channel Lighted Buoy "3" (buoy "3") at the previously scheduled time of 0845, to embark a Navy docking pilot for docking the vessel at the Naval Station. At 0805, the OOD ordered the Eisenhower's speed to be reduced to 5 knots (25 rpm). About 1 minute later, when the Eisenhower was about 0.6 nmi east of Old Point Comfort Light, the OOD ordered the course changed to the left to 229T from 258T. The new course of 229T was along the southern edge of anchorages "A" and "B" as marked on NOAA chart 12245 (47th edition). According to the CO, the vessel was following its preplanned track toward the northern edge of the Entrance Reach Channel and Hampton Roads. He also stated that on the new course, the wind would be coming from about 60 degrees off the port bow and a flood current of about 2 knots would be "pushing the vessel." The navigator stated that the computed wind was 23 knots on the port beam after the course change. At 0820, the meteorology officer on the Eisenhower determined the wind to be from 150T at 20 knots. The visual navigation plotting team was taking fixes at 2-minute intervals after leaving Thimble Shoal Channel and after the turn to the left obtained a fix at 0807. (See figure 2.)

The officers on the bridge of the Eisenhower observed the Urduliz anchored in anchorage "A," with its anchor chain leading forward under a moderate strain, with the bow pointing into the wind, towards the Entrance Reach Channel. The CO stated that the Urduliz heading was "just about perpendicular to our track,...." The officer on watch on the Urduliz estimated that his vessel was heading about 110T just prior to the accident. The navigator, OOD, and JOOD independently estimated, to themselves, that the Eisenhower would pass about 100 yards from the Urduliz and that the anchored vessel posed no hazard to their vessel.

The backup or radar navigation team took fixes at 3‑minute intervals and advised the bridge that the vessel was "on track" at 0810, but the visual navigation team reported "no fix." At 0811, the navigator recommended that the OOD reduce speed to 3 knots (15 rpm) because the Eisenhower was about 4 minutes ahead of its scheduled time of 0845, for embarking the Navy docking pilot at buoy "3." The navigator recalled that he made the recommendation directly to the OOD "just loud enough to him to hear." The OOD then ordered the conning officer to reduce speed to 3 knots, who in turn, ordered the lee helm⁵ to order the new speed to the enginerooms. The navigator stated that the reason that he recommended that the OOD reduce speed was because: "I felt that‑‑‑I had some check marks on my chart and I knew where I was supposed to be when, in order to make that estimate, and I was within 4 minutes, in my mind, of being there right on time." When asked about arriving 4 minutes ahead of schedule, the navigator replied, "It's professional to be at a position when you say you're going to be there and I wanted to do that." He said that he did not want to be at "buoy '3' earlier than that and not have a pilot and tugs coming at me,...[when we are] ready to start our process of going alongside the pier." At 0813, the radar navigation team reported that the Eisenhower was 25 yards to the right of the intended track. At 0814, the Admiral in command of the Battle Group, quartered in the Eisenhower, entered the navigation bridge and his presence was announced. When asked if it was normal for the Admiral to be on the bridge, the CO stated, "That was about his third‑‑for the morning, about his third time on the bridge. He just came by, said, 'How are things going?' and left. It didn't create any disturbance and we don't all snap to attention or anything like that when he comes on the bridge. Someone announces the Admiral's on the bridge and boom‑boom there he is and somebody announces when he leaves, the Admiral's left the bridge, if somebody notices. It wasn't a disturbance factor." As the 0816 radar fix was plotted in TOP, the TOP liaison officer observed that the fix was "well right, [I] went out [to the navigation bridge] and told the navigator that the latest fix shows us at least 150 yards right, just to give him a heads up and the report came over the phone talker, officially to the OOD, the captain [CO] we were 200 yards right [of track]." The visual navigation team had not been able to obtain an acceptable fix between 0807 and 0817 and were unable to provide an explanation as to why. The chief quartermaster (chief) who was supervising the plotting of visual fixes said that at 0809 there was no fix, but that is not unusual to occasionally fail to get a fix because of missing the correct object or misreading a bearing number from the gyrocompass. But at 0810, there also was no fix. At that point, he believed that there may have been an equipment failure of some sort and had all the bearing takers check their equipment. The chief also said that the compass readings were within tenths of a degree of each other, "very minor." Attempts to get fixes continued at 1‑minute intervals, but the navigation plotter could not get a fix. About

0815, the chief relieved the plotter and erased part of the plot. He had the bearing takers check their equipment again, identify and describe the objects that they were to take bearings of, and ordered another round of visual bearings. At 0817, the visual navigation team obtained a fix that determined the Eisenhower to be about 380 yards to the right of its intended trackline. The chief said that as he was preparing to make his report, the OOD and the CO were taking action to avoid the collision.

At 0817, the OOD ordered left 10 degrees rudder and the vessel began to change course to 225T from 229T; he also advised the CO that the vessel's speed had been reduced to 3 knots. The CO stated that he had not been aware that the navigator had recommended that the OOD slow the vessel to 3 knots or that the OOD had ordered the speed reduced. The CO further stated that he "did not hear the call to the lee helm to indicate one five RPM .... which is 3 knots, and as soon as I was aware of this happening I ordered him to increase speed to 5 knots." About 0818, as the bow of the Eisenhower passed the extended centerline from the bow of the Urduliz, the CO, navigator, and OOD realized that the bearing to the Urduliz was no longer changing and a collision was imminent. The CO estimated that the distance between the vessels was about 100 to 200 feet at the time. The CO stated that the 10 degree left rudder was inadequate and directed the OOD to increase the rudder to 20 degrees left, and then to 30 degrees left; the CO then took over the maneuvering of the vessel.

The Navy docking pilot, on a tug en route to the Eisenhower, was about 1 mile away and believed that the Eisenhower was going to collide with the anchored Urduliz. He said that he didn't think the Eisenhower had much way (motion through the water), and was going sideways almost as fast as she was going ahead.

About 0819, the internal collision alarm and six blasts on the whistle (according to the Inland Navigation Rules, the danger signal is five or more blasts on the whistle) were sounded on the Eisenhower. The CO stated that he ordered "shift your rudder" (rudder moved from left 30 degrees to right 30 degrees), and the engines were stopped about 0820. The Eisenhower struck the Urduliz about 0820, when it was about 400 yards to the right of its intended track. The CO stated that the nuclear‑attack submarine that had made the meeting agreement with them, was passing them in the Entrance Reach Channel on the port side, when the Eisenhower came into contact with the Urduliz. The submarine's berth was about 3.5 nmi from buoy "1ER." The Eisenhower struck the bow of the Urduliz with its starboard side between the No. 1 and No. 2 aircraft elevators. The bow of the Urduliz was caught under the overhang of the flight deck and the anchored vessel was dragged about 1,000 yards from its location in berth "Z," anchorage "A," to the southwest near the center of berth "Y," anchorage "B." The bow of the Urduliz also scraped along the starboard side of the Eisenhower for about 175 feet. The vessels remained together until 0833, when they separated without any action taken by either vessel.

The officer on watch (the third officer) on the Urduliz observed the Eisenhower approaching, but did not take any action or sound a danger signal because he believed that the vessel would come close but "would have sufficient measures to go by without colliding." However, he sent a messenger to notify the master of the potential danger. The first officer was in his room when he saw the Eisenhower approaching and went to the bridge. The master also observed the Eisenhower from a window in his office and proceeded to the bridge. On his way to the bridge, the master was met by the messenger. The master and the first officer arrived on the bridge of the Urduliz at the moment of collision. The master and the officer on watch did not hear the danger signal from the Eisenhower, but the officer on watch did hear the internal collision alarm sound from the Eisenhower. The master ordered the chief engineer to prepare the engine to be ready to answer bells and to start the emergency fire pump. He also ordered the first officer to the bow and to prepare to fight a fire, if necessary. The master and his deck watch stood‑by on the bridge waiting for the Virginia Pilot Association pilot, who was en route, to move the Urduliz to the coal loading piers. About 0830, the pilot arrived on the bridge of the Urduliz. About 0837, after the vessels disengaged from one another, they were facing almost in opposite directions, with the bow of the Urduliz heading about 075T. Tension on the anchor chain caused the starboard stern of the Urduliz to swing toward the starboard bow of the Eisenhower. To prevent a second collision, the pilot on the Urduliz ordered "hard right wheel, [and] a slow ahead bell..." and moved the vessel away from the Eisenhower. The pilot remained on the anchored Urduliz and at 1700, he piloted the vessel to the grain pier south of the Naval Station for a damage survey and temporary repairs.

The Navy docking pilot proceeded toward the Eisenhower after passing around the stern of the Urduliz. He did not see any propeller action from the Urduliz as he passed the vessel. At 0837, the CO ordered the rudder to right 30 degrees and the engines to slow astern. Shortly thereafter, the docking pilot arrived on the bridge of the Eisenhower and the CO passed the conn to the docking pilot. After taking over the conn, the docking pilot used four tugs on the port side of the Eisenhower, two on the bow and two on the stern, to push the Eisenhower further away from the Urduliz, and then proceeded to dock the vessel. At 0943, the Eisenhower was docked at the south side of pier 12, at the Naval Station.

Injuries to Persons

There were no injuries or deaths.

Damage to Vessels

Urduliz.--Damage to the Urduliz hull was confined to the bow above the waterline. The forecastle bulwark and deck were crushed and torn for a distance of about 12 feet aft of the stem on the centerline. The bow was also pushed in and holed into the forecastle. Permanent repairs to the Urduliz were accomplished between September 22 and 30, 1988, at the Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares Shipyard, El Ferrol, Spain. The cost of temporary and permanent repairs of the damage to the Urduliz was about $317,128. During the repair periods, the owners of the Urduliz sustained additional financial losses of $341,587 for having the vessel out of service, for a total cost of $658,715.

Eisenhower.‑‑Damage to the Eisenhower hull was confined to the starboard side between 50 and 65 feet above the waterline, along the underside of the flight deck. The damage extended from about midpoint between No. 1 and No. 2 aircraft elevators at the flight deck, aft to a point about midway under the flight deck level of the "island" superstructure, a distance of about 175 feet. There was minor structural damage to the underside, of the No. 2 elevator; however, the damage did not affect its operation. Walkways and safety nets were crushed and torn away from the underside of the flight deck. The CO's cabin located under the island was extensively damaged. In addition, 23 inflatable liferafts were dislodged from their stowed positions on the starboard side of the flight deck. Some of the liferafts came to rest on the forecastle of the Urduliz, while the others went into the water and were recovered by Coast Guard patrol boats. The cost of repairing the damage on the Eisenhower was estimated to be $2 million. The repairs were completed in conjunction with the Eisenhower's previously scheduled shipyard period between October 3, 1988, and March 10, 1989.

Crew Information

Urduliz.-‑There were 38 persons on board the Urduliz at the time of the accident; 36 crewmembers and 2 Spanish citizens carried as persons in addition to the crew. All crewmembers were Spanish citizens who were either licensed or documented by the Spanish government. The master of the Urduliz had held his position on the vessel for about 2 1/2 months, the period of time that the present owner had owned the vessel. He had been working for this company for 24 years and been master of several of their vessels for 15 years. The master had been going to sea for the past 34 years and had held a master's license for 26 of those years. The third officer had held his position on the vessel for about 20 days and had been aboard 4 months during the early part of 1988, when the vessel was owned by another company. He had been going to sea for the past 13 years.

Eisenhower.--When fully manned, the Eisenhower carried a crew of 6,042 officers and enlisted men, consisting of 3,105 in the ship crew, 72 marines, and 2,865 in the air wing.⁶

The CO, a 51‑year‑old aviator with the rank of captain, assumed command of the Eisenhower in October 1986. At the time of the accident, he had served in the Navy as a commissioned officer for about 28 years and had accumulated almost 14 years of sea duty. Immediately before his assignment to the Eisenhower, he had served 2 years as the CO of the combat stores auxiliary vessel USS Niagagra Falls (AFS‑3), preceded by almost 3 years as

executive officer (XO) on the nuclear‑powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN‑70), a sister vessel to the Eisenhower. While assigned to the Vinson and the Eisenhower, he had completed numerous transits of Hampton Roads. Prior to his assignment as XO of the Vinson, about 7 years of his 14 years of sea duty was on aircraft carriers as an aviator assigned to various aviation units.

The CO reported that during the night before the accident, he slept in his cabin between 2130 and 0430. He said that he had slept well, interrupted by only a few calls about vessel traffic. He awoke at 0430, went to the bridge, and remained there throughout the morning. He stated that he felt rested and that his judgment had not been impaired by fatigue.

The navigator, a 42‑year‑old aviator with the rank of commander, was assigned as navigator of the Eisenhower in November 1986. At the time of the accident, he had served in the Navy as a commissioned officer for about 20 years. Prior to this assignment, he had about 2 1/2 years of sea duty, from September 1976, to January 1979, on board the aircraft carrier Midway (CV 41), stationed in Japan. He served as assistant navigator and qualified as OOD. Upon assignment to the Eisenhower, he completed the navigation officer shipboard celestial navigation course and a 2‑day practical shiphandling course. He qualified as Command Duty Officer (CDO)(underway)⁷ in February 1987. He was the navigator during the Eisenhower's coastal, Latin American, and Caribbean operations, when the vessel was brought to readiness for fleet operations prior to departure to the Mediterranean Sea on February 29, 1988. He accrued a career total of 4 years of non-aviation sea duty in two assignments as assistant navigator and navigator aboard two aircraft carriers (MIDWAY and Eisenhower, respectively) in the preceding 12 years before this accident, which were separated by 8 years of aviation assignments. Prior to the date of this accident, he had completed numerous transits of Hampton Roads while assigned as the navigation officer on the Eisenhower. He said that he "got 8 hours plus sleep the night of the 27th, which is embarrassing for a navigator." He also said that during the evening before entering Norfolk harbor (28th), he had "...plenty of sleep;" he slept 6 hours between 2100 and 0300, with two brief interruptions. He awoke at 0300, and arrived on the bridge at 0330.

The OOD, a 32‑year‑old aviator with the rank of lieutenant, was assigned as assistant navigator on the Eisenhower in June 1987, for his first shipboard assignment. At the time of the

accident, he had served in the Navy as a commissioned officer for about 10 years. He served as assistant navigator during the Eisenhower coastal, Latin American, and Caribbean operations before departing on the Mediterranean Sea deployment. He became qualified as OOD (underway) in August 1987. He had never served as OOD during a transit of Hampton Roads. He said that during the evening before entering Norfolk harbor, he had 5 hours sleep, awoke at 0300 and arrived on the bridge at 0345 to assume the duties of navigation officer‑of‑the‑watch. At 0530, the vessel's navigator assumed the duties of navigation officer‑of-the‑watch and the assistant navigator assumed the duties as OOD for entering port.

The CO, navigator, and OOD each reported that they were in good health and not suffering from any chronic or acute ailments or illnesses at the time of the accident. Each reported that his vision and hearing were within normal limits. This investigation disclosed no evidence of adverse medical history, chronic, or acute ailments to suggest that the performance of any member of the navigation crew was adversely affected by his physical condition. (See appendix 8 for additional details about the crew.)

Vessel Information

The principal characteristics of the two vessels are as follows (see figure 5):

Urduliz Eisenhower⁸

Length 897 feet 1,090 feet

Breadth 128 feet 134 feet

252 feet (flight deck)

Depth 64.3 feet 68 feet

Draft at

Time of Accident 22.5 feet(forward) 36 feet

28.5 feet (aft)

Loaded Draft 47.6 feet 39 feet

Gross Tonnage 53,728 ---

Deadweight Tons 106,476

Displacement Tons --- 91,700 (loaded)

70,916 (light)

Horsepower 24,750 280,000

Urduliz.--The Urduliz, Lloyd's Register of Shipping number 7320526, originally named Urquiola, was built in December 1973, by Astilleros Espanoles DCN S.A., Bilbao, Spain, as a tank vessel. After a grounding and fire in May 1976, the forward and cargo sections were replaced in August 1983, at the Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares Shipyard, El Ferrol, Spain. The rebuilt vessel was renamed Argos. The cargo tanks of the rebuilt Argos were strengthened to enable the vessel to carry heavy bulk cargoes. In May 1988, the vessel was purchased by its present owner, Naviera Vizcaina S.A., Bilbao, Spain, and renamed Urduliz.

The Urduliz was a single-rudder, single-screw, motor vessel powered by a two-cycle, single-acting 9 cylinder diesel engine. The deckhouse was located aft and it had a raised forecastle. The navigation bridge was located about 745 feet aft of the bow and the height of eye⁹ was about 84 feet above the waterline. Between the forecastle and the deckhouse were nine cargo holds/tanks. It had a normal bulk carrier bow, with the bow flaring forward about 15 feet from the hull at the 50-foot height above the keel to the forecastle bulwark to minimize deck wetness. The top of the bow bulwark was about 82.5 feet above the keel.

The Urduliz was equipped with standard navigational equipment, including two Raytheon marine radars, one Raytheon collision avoidance radar, one Magnavox satellite navigation system, one Decca navigation system, and one loran-C navigation system, one ITT direction finder, one Japan Marine Company fathometer, and an Anschutz gyroscope compass with a repeater on each bridge wing. The navigation charts for Hampton Roads had been corrected to show the latest buoy locations.

Eisenhower.--The Eisenhower was the third nuclear-powered aircraft carrier built at the Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Company, Newport News, Virginia. It was commissioned for service in the United States Navy on October 13, 1977. The ship had two rudders, four propellers, and was powered by four steam turbines. Main propulsion steam was provided by two Westinghouse nuclear reactors. The Eisenhower had a top speed in excess of 30 knots. The vessel cost approximately $1.9 billion to build.

The navigation bridge was in the superstructure on the starboard side of the flight deck, known as the "island," about 673 feet aft of the bow. The height of eye on the navigation bridge was about 45 feet above the flight deck and about 108 feet above the waterline. The starboard side of the bridge was offset outboard from the starboard side of the hull about 60 feet and about 106 feet from the vessel centerline. The flight deck creates a "shadow area" within which small floating objects cannot be seen. The extent of the area obstructed from view varies depending upon the height of the observer above the deck. From the navigation bridge, the area obstructed varied from about 620 yards on the bow, to about 195 yards on the port beam, and to about 357 yards on the stern (see figure 6).

The Eisenhower navigation bridge measures about 40 feet from port to starboard and about 10 feet from forward to aft. Extending out from the starboard after corner of the bridge was an auxiliary conning station. It measured about 6 feet by 6 feet square. This station had windows on three sides for visibility from forward to aft on the starboard side of the vessel. The main navigation bridge windows provided a view to starboard, forward, to port, and a full view of the flight deck forward and aft. On the after side of the bridge was a passageway on each side leading from the bridge, and the TOP compartment forming the center after bulkhead. (see figure 7.)

The Eisenhower navigation bridge was equipped with a Raycas V marine radar, a Furuno radar, two radar repeaters, a Northstar loran receiver, a Shipmate Decca receiver, two satellite receivers, a fathometer, and five gyroscope compass repeaters (one at the chart table on the starboard forward corner, one on the port side aft by a window, two in the auxiliary conning station, and one that was on a 5-foot track at the forward center windows). The helm, engine order telegraph, two gyroscope compasses, and a magnetic compass were in a console to the left and aft of the center windows. There were two stationary chairs: one for the CO on the port side forward of the after gyroscope compass repeater and one for the navigator on the starboard side aft of the chart table.

All navigation equipment was operating properly both before, during, and after the accident. The navigation charts for Hampton Roads had been corrected to show the latest buoy locations.

Waterway Information

Norfolk, Virginia, is located at the southeastern part of the state and at the southwestern corner of the Chesapeake Bay. The U.S. Naval Station piers at Norfolk are located about 18 nmi west of the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay from the Atlantic Ocean. To reach the piers, vessels from the ocean must transit Thimble Shoal Channel, which crosses the southern end of the Chesapeake Bay; pass through the bridge opening at the lower end of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel; pass between Old Point Comfort on the north and Fort Wool on the south; transit the Entrance Reach Channel at Hampton Roads; and enter the Norfolk Harbor Reach Channel which is adjacent to the west side of the Naval Station. The channels are maintained at a minimum depth of 45 feet. (See the "Other Information" section for more details on the channels.) Except for areas close to shore, the water is about 18 feet deep from the Atlantic Ocean to Hampton Roads. The channel boundaries are marked by numerous buoys along the route. The buoys are generally 1/4 nmi apart near turns to about 1 nmi apart along straight sections of a channel.

The predicted tidal currents calculated by the Safety Board from the Tidal Current Tables¹⁰ for 0.55 nmi east of Old Point Comfort (37 00.12'N, 76 17.72'W) for August 29, 1988, were:

Time State of Current Speed Direction

0421 slack water 0.0 ----

0807 flood 1.7 knots 251T

0931 maximum flood 2.2 knots 251T

The predicted tidal currents calculated by the Safety Board for 0.2 nmi south of Old Point Comfort (36 59.77'N, 76 18.88'W) for August 29, 1988, were:

Time State Of Current Speed Direction

0646 slack water 0.0 ---

0815 flood 1.5 knots 240T

0938 maximum flood 2.7 knots 240T

The predicted tidal currents calculated by the Safety Board for 0.2 nmi northwest of Fort Wool (36 59.3'N, 76 18.42'W) for August 29, 1988, were:

Time State of Current Speed Direction

0614 slack water 0.0 ---

0815 flood 1.6 knots 240T

0851 maximum flood 2.1 knots 240T

The predicted tidal currents calculated by the Safety Board for mid-channel off Old Point Comfort (36 59.3'N, 76 19.3'W) for August 29, 1988, were (see figure 2 for the locations of the predicted currents):

Time State of Current Speed Direction

0646 slack water 0.0 ---

0815 flood 1.2 knots 260T

0951 maximum flood 2.5 knots 260T

Shortly after the accident, the Coast Guard checked the position of the Thimble Shoal channel buoys "21" and "22", and Entrance Reach Channel buoys "1ER," "3," and "5," and found them to be operating properly and at the position as required on the navigation charts of the area, as corrected by and listed in the weekly Notice to Mariners No.18/88 dated April 30, 1988.

Meteorological Information

The weather as reported by the meteorological officer on the Eisenhower was 6 miles visibility, air temperature 78.5 F, wind direction from 150T at 20 knots, and 2-foot "wind" waves. The prevailing winds from March through August and November through January are from the southwest, in February from the north‑northeast, and in September and October from the northeast. The temperatures are generally mild with about 2 days of heavy fog per month.

Other Information

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Projects in the Norfolk, VA, Area.--In 1969 and 1970, dredging of the channels to a depth of 45 feet was completed in the Hampton Roads area and the Thimble Shoal Channel. According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (COE) Project Engineer for Dredging Management, Norfolk, the depths and channel configurations were maintained accordingly, until recently. In 1986, the COE was authorized under a project entitled "Norfolk Harbor and Channels, Virginia" to dredge channels in the Hampton Roads area and Thimble Shoal Channel to a depth of 55 feet, in two phases. During phase I, which was completed December 15, 1988, the COE dredged 650 feet of the outbound-side of the 1,000-foot wide channels at Thimble Shoal, Entrance Reach, Newport News, and Norfolk Harbor Reach to a depth of 50 feet and the remaining 350 feet on the inbound-side were maintained at 45 feet. The Entrance Reach Channel was also reduced in width from 1,500 feet to 1,000 feet. The COE expects to commence phase II, dredging the 650-foot channel width to the 55-foot depth and the 350-foot side to the 50-foot depth, in fiscal year 1991.

Entrance Reach Channel and Channel Marking.--The Entrance Reach Channel is located between Old Point Comfort and Fort Wool on the east and Sewells Point in the west, where it joins the Newport News Channel and the Norfolk Harbor Reach Channel. Prior to March 30, 1988, the southern side of the Entrance Reach Channel was marked with the Elizabeth River Channel Lighted Horn Buoy (LHB) "1" (buoy "1") near Fort Wool and the Elizabeth River Channel Lighted Buoy "3" (buoy "3") northwest of Sewells Point. A line drawn between the buoys marked the southern edge of the 45-foot channel. The northern side of the channel was located on the southern edge of anchorages "A" (berth "Z") and "B" (berths "X," "Y," and "W"), and generally on a line drawn between the Naval Ordnance Lighted Buoy "T" (buoy "T") east of Old Point Comfort and the Newport News Channel Lighted Buoy "2" (buoy "2"). The distance between buoy "T" and buoy "2" is about 3.5 nmi. The width of the channel was 1,500 feet.

On March 24, 1988, Thimble Shoal Channel Lighted Buoy "22" (buoy "22"), near Thimble Shoal Light, was relocated close to the eastern side of Old Point Comfort. There are no buoys between buoy "22" and buoy "2" on the "new" northern side of the Entrance Reach Channel a distance of about 3.2 nmi. When the Coast Guard witness was asked how the northern side of the channel will be delineated from the anchorage, he said that: "There will be no markings adjacent to the channel or demarcation line adjacent to the channel. Generally, when you put buoys near an anchorage, they get run over and they serve only as a hazard to navigation." A vessel on a course coinciding with a line drawn between relocated buoy "22" and buoy "2" would be encroaching on the southern edge of anchorages "A" and "B."

On March 29, buoy "3," also located on the south side of the channel, was relocated about 200 yards to the north, on the 50-foot water depth contour curve. On March 30, 1988, buoy "1," located on the southern side of the channel, was relocated about 700 yards to the west at the edge of the 50-foot water depth contour curve and renamed buoy "1ER." As a result of these changes, the Entrance Reach Channel became 1,000 feet wide between the lines created by buoy "22" and buoy "2" (on the northern side) and the Elizabeth River Lighted Buoy "1ER" (buoy "1ER") and buoy "3" (on the southern side). Further, the new location of these buoys on the southern side of the channel, and the southern edge of anchorages "A" and "B" on the northern side of the channel, as marked on the navigation charts available at the time of the accident, reduced the width of the channel available south of Anchorages' "A" and "B" to about 700 feet near buoy "1ER" and to about 900 feet near buoy "3." The charts on the Eisenhower and the Urduliz, in use on the date of the accident, had been corrected with these buoy changes.

The CO of the Eisenhower testified about the new channel configuration and said that "...there's not adequate room for two ships to pass. Not carrier-size ships or a carrier-size ship and a submarine."

Anchorages.--The anchorages in the Hampton Roads area at the time of the accident are described in the regulations at Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subpart 110.168. In the Hampton Roads area, there are a number of anchorages for use by commercial and naval vessels. Counter-clockwise from Old Point Comfort to Newport News, Virginia, the anchorages were designated: "A," "B," "C," "E," "D," "H," and "F-1." Anchorage "A" was reserved for commercial vessels undergoing examination for quarantine, customs, or immigration. It was also used by deep draft vessels waiting for a dock to load or unload cargo. Vessel masters were not required to obtain permission to anchor in this anchorage. In the southeast corner of the anchorage was located the 1,500-foot-radius berth "Z." The edge of the radius of berth "Z" was about 650 feet north of the northern edge of the Entrance Reach Channel before the channel was narrowed. After it was narrowed, the outer edge of berth "Z" was about 300 feet from the channel edge. Anchorage "B" was a deep water Naval anchorage. Within the anchorage boundaries were located three circular 1,800-foot-radius berths: "W," "X," and "Y." The southern boundary of anchorages "A" and "B" (berths "W," "X," "Y," and "Z") was also the northern edge of the previous Entrance Reach Channel, but it was not marked by any buoys.

On March 22, 1984, the Coast Guard published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking announcing its intention to review and amend the anchorage regulations for Hampton Roads and adjacent waters. The proposal was made to accommodate the intended construction of the Newport News Bridge-Tunnel, a proposed widening and deepening of the Newport News Channel, and the construction of a Navy ammunition barge mooring facility in anchorage "B." The Coast Guard stated that after the proposal was published "there were a multitude of meetings held with the Virginia Pilot Association, industry groups and the U.S. Navy to discuss changes to the anchorages and channel realignment/marking." No other proposals were published until June 3, 1988, when the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking to completely revise the special anchorage areas, anchorage grounds, and regulated navigation areas in the Hampton Roads area. The proposal to revise the regulations was prompted by dredging projects that had been completed, were in progress, or were planned for the Hampton Roads area and "a culmination of those meetings, discussions and negotiations [held between 1984 and 1988]." One of the changes adopted was the renaming of anchorages "A," "B," and "C" to "F," "G," and "H." Anchorages "A" and part of "B" became anchorage "F," parts of anchorages "B" and "C" became anchorage "G," and the remaining part of anchorage "C" became anchorage "H." Berths "X" and "Y" (in anchorage "B") and berth "Z" (in anchorage "A") were renamed to berths "G2," "Gl," "Fl," and "F2," respectively. (See figure 8.) The southern boundary of anchorages "G" and "F" were moved northward in order to be aligned with the new northern edge of the Entrance Reach Channel. Berth "F2" has roughly the same southern position as the previous berth "Z" and is about 100 yards north of the new channel edge. The final rules were published in the Federal Register on January 9, 1989, and became effective on February 8, 1989.

Pilotage.‑‑The State of Virginia requires foreign vessels, or U.S. registered vessels departing on or returning, from a foreign voyage to engage the services of a State pilot (pilot). The Federal government requires a Coast Guard licensed pilot on a U.S. commercial vessel of 1,600 gross tons or more on a coastwise voyage while the vessel is in U.S. "pilotage waters." The master of a U.S. commercial vessel on a coastwise voyage can satisfy this requirement by employing a State pilot with a Federal license or independent Federally licensed pilot, or by utilizing a member of the vessel's crew who has been issued a Coast Guard pilot's license for those waters. Federal law excludes military and other public vessels from State or Federal pilot requirements.

There are two state pilot associations for the Chesapeake Bay: The Association of Maryland Pilots, and The Virginia Pilot Association (VPA). The pilots in these associations are licensed to pilot any foreign or domestic vessel to any respective Maryland or Virginia port. There is also a Federal pilot association: the Chesapeake and Interstate Pilots (C & IP) whose members pilot domestic vessels not on foreign voyages on the waterways for which they are licensed by the Coast Guard. All pilots are embarked and debarked at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay.

The Navy in Norfolk, Virginia, does have contracts with pilot associations and pilots are available for use by naval vessels. The Naval Station Port Operations Department will arrange for a pilot for a naval vessel upon request. If the pilots are not ordered through the Naval Station, then the services are charged to the requesting vessel's funds. In November 1985, the C&IP was awarded the Navy contract for piloting its vessels in the Chesapeake Bay area. The association's six pilots reported that between November 1985 and November 1988, they piloted about 292 naval ships of all sizes, most of which were large deep draft vessels (vessels with drafts in excess of 25 feet). Each C&IP pilot averages about 50 commercial ship transits a year in the Hampton Roads area. According to the Commander, Naval Station (COMNAVSTA), Norfolk, Virginia, between October 1, 1987, and September 30, 1988, 2,028 Naval vessels arrived or departed the Naval Station or the Craney Island Fuel Depot, southwest of the Naval Station. The Navy did not have any vessel movement data for other locations in the Hampton Roads area.

Between November 1984 and November 1985, the last year that the VPA had the Navy piloting contract, the approximately 51 VPA pilots piloted 146 naval ships of all sizes, most of which were larger deep draft vessels. Each VPA pilot averages about 170 commercial vessel transits a year in the Hampton Roads area.

Officers, including CO's, of Navy vessels stationed in Norfolk revealed that Navy vessels transiting Hampton Roads do not routinely utilize the services of pilots between the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and buoy "3," as use of these pilots is viewed by some as a reflection that the vessels crew had less than a professional shiphandling ability. The navigator of the Eisenhower also said that it was uncommon for a Navy ship to embark a pilot going in or out of Norfolk, but that he had discussed doing so with the CO while planning the port arrival. The navigator of the Eisenhower said that: "I told him [CO] what I had learned [from a visit to the VPA station at Cape Henry, Virginia] and told him what their capabilities seemed to be and he [the CO] said, 'well, I don't think we need a pilot, but really I'll leave that to you. If you really feel strongly that we need a pilot, we'll get a pilot.' So I thought about it for a period of time...and made my own determination that we just did not need a pilot."

When the CO of the Eisenhower was asked about the policy of the Navy to utilize pilots, he replied, "I couldn't answer what the Navy policy is, I really don't know." The CO's responsibility concerning pilotage is set forth in Navy regulations at Title 32 CFR Subpart 700.754, and the CO's responsibility for safe navigation of his vessel is set forth in Subpart 700.755(a).

32 CFR 700.754: Pilotage.

(a) The commanding officer shall:

(1) Pilot the ship under all ordinary circumstances,

but he may employ pilots whenever in his judgment such,

employment is prudent.

(2) Not call a pilot on board until the ship is ready

to proceed.

(3) Not retain a pilot on board after the ship has

reached her destination or point where pilot is no

longer required.

(4) Give preference to licensed pilots.

(5) Pay pilots no more than the local rates.

(b) A pilot is merely an adviser to the commanding officer.

His presence on board shall not relieve the commanding

officer or any of his subordinates from their responsibility